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In the era of the 'clash of civilisations', culture has taken centre stage in both global and local politics. Since September 11, 2001, inter-cultural relations have been powerfully recast, in much policy and popular debate, in terms of an underlying cultural -or 'civilisational' (Huntington 2002) conflict between the values of the 'West' and 'Islam'. For the neo-cons, this supposed clash is at the heart of the War on Terror, being fought against terrorists both abroad and the 'home-grown' variety. Post-9/11 nationalisms are increasingly aggressive and suspicious of cultural minorities. In Australia and elsewhere, Muslims and Arabs have been particularly vilified as threats to social cohesion and national security. This led to a widespread backlash against multiculturalism under John Howard, whose government (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) replaced multiculturalism with the concept of integration in policies and public discourse. So far, the government of Kevin Rudd has done little to restore a public valuing of cultural diversity.
This section explores how social movements can respond, and in particular, examines the challenges facing activists working across cultural difference on some of the most important political work of our time, involving anti-war, anti-racist, feminist, and civil liberties activism. Analysis of social movements in these arenas is crucial because responding to neoconservative cultural politics is not a simple or straightforward process. Each possible path comes with its own underlying politics. Yet there is surprisingly little research on the effectiveness and political implications of different activist approaches. As Bonnett (2000: 2) notes, there is a large body of research on racism, but anti-racism is mainly seen as simply a 'cause', 'fit only for platitudes of support or denouncement'.
But first, some historical context: under the Howard Government, Australia went through a series of 'moral panics' about race, culture and ethnicity, focused squarely on Muslims and Arabs. From the Middle Eastern asylum seekers who were demonised as queue-jumpers and locked away in detention centres, to the 'ethnic gang rapists' who were allegedly terrorising The backlash against multiculturalism is particularly visible in two shifts in public policy and discourse under the Howard Government. The first is what Lentin (2008: 313) describes as the 'positive turn', in which the 'negativity' of anti-racism is replaced with a much less oppositional 'celebration of diversity'. This is the politics of the supposedly post-racial age (Goldberg 2002) . In Australia, this celebratory approach to cultural difference is epitomised in the evolution of official multicultural policy, which has seen all references to racism gradually eradicated from policy and public discourse, replaced by notions such as 'living in harmony' (DIAC 2008) . Official programs have increasingly encouraged community projects that emphasise and celebrate 'what we have in common', rather than critical initiatives that seek to explore the continuation of inter-communal or institutionalised racism Dreher 2006, Ho 2007 ).
The second shift, coexisting alongside the first, is a 'securitisation' of multicultural policy, which has seen a growing focus on the surveillance of minority communities, in particular, scouring Muslim communities for potential threats to national security, monitoring religious leaders, and 'de-radicalising' young Muslim men (Bergin et al 2007 , Jakubowicz 2008 ). This policy direction has continued under the Rudd Government.
Clearly, constructions of culture, race and religion are at the heart of the security agenda that cohesion' to define debates. In spite of its faults, the absence of any substantial attempts to politically defend multiculturalism has been striking.
What explains this weak response from the grassroots? Historically, progressive movements in Australia have tended to be Anglo-dominated, with a relatively weak record of working with people from other backgrounds. The traditional monoculturalism of Australian labour, feminist and other movements has been well documented (e.g. Ang 1995 , Bulbeck 1998 , Ho 2008 , Kaplan 1996 . Post-war migrants often had comparatively high levels of unionisation resistant to any expansion of religious discourse or identity in public politics. This is an awkward position from which to respond to the rise of Islamophobia.
Ideologically, the lack of activism also reflects the complex status of issues relating to culture and ethnicity in traditional progressive movements. On one level, the traditional leftist emphasis on class conflict marginalises race and culture. Racism is seen as an epiphenomenon of social divisions that are ultimately class-based. Minorities working on anti-racist politics have been viewed almost as victims of false consciousness, racialising and segregating themselves (Lentin 2008: 321) , at the cost of a strong and coherent progressive political agenda. Along with gender and sexuality, issues around cultural diversity have always sat uneasily within leftist agendas, traditionally seen as potentially undermining political solidarity, and distractions from the main game of class-based inequality.
On a more practical level, the preoccupation with political unity has created a tendency for leftists to attempt to incorporate anti-racist activity within broader political movements, including assuming leadership of anti-racist movements. This has then led to charges of the re-colonisation of marginalised communities by larger, and usually White-dominated political movements. In the UK, the Socialist Workers Party's leadership of the Anti-Nazi League attracted this sort of criticism (Dawson 2005) .
Ultimately, the fear of being perceived as 'interfering' or 'taking over' anti-racist movements has produced a form of passivity or avoidance on the part of some progressive movements.
Non-action is seen as the most appropriate response in order to respect minority communities' autonomy and integrity. Goodall (2005: 69- This means that although some of these organisations do espouse an anti-racism agenda, it is often defensive and self-serving, devoid of a larger vision for social justice. There is a strikingly low level of cross-ethnic solidarity among migrant community groups, as seen, for example, in the lack of support for asylum seekers from those who prided themselves on not having 'queue-jumped' into the country. Some attempts to defend a cultural minority have been otherwise spectacularly regressive, for example, the then Mufti of Australia, Sheik Taj el-din Al Hilaly, in 2006 defending Muslim men by characterising immodestly dressed women as 'uncovered meat' inviting sexual assault (Kerbaj 2006) .
In this era of Islamophobia, Muslim community organisations have often become extremely defensive, responding to hostility by defending Islam at all costs. All too often this has led to essentialist and conservative definitions of Islam which do not provide strong foundations for a progressive anti-racist agenda. For example, as Shakira Hussein (2007) In his paper, Dinesh Wadiwel takes this note of caution further, posing some provocative questions about whether solidarity is in fact possible at all. While cross-cultural solidarity and alliances are generally seen as inherently desirable, Wadiwel argues that uncritical statements of solidarity can hide an underlying reality of conflict and even a state of war. He explores the notion that perhaps 'we don't have any common ground; that our starting point suggests we have no reason to work with each other; that we have no natural affiliations, perhaps no common enemy. Indeed you and I might be considered enemies'.
In a profound critique of liberal ideals of civil society and inter-personal dialogue and friendship as tools for equality and democracy, Wadiwel shows that the public sphere is often not civil at all, and expressions of solidarity can have the effect of preventing recognition of continuing conflict. He uses the example of the widespread practice at public events of acknowledging Indigenous ownership of land:
An acknowledgement of prior sovereignty hides the truth of war within it: the fact that I stand on this land because war has occurred, and continues to this day… Really I should acknowledge that a war has occurred, a war that continues today, a war that I am inescapably part of, because I stand here.
Against the prevailing assumptions that solidarity comprises natural relationships of easy friendship, Wadiwel retorts that such relationships are almost never symmetrical, and that some parties always benefit more than others. Failure to recognise this reality can mean that activist collaborations simply 'intensify war' between people unequally positioned in a society marked by division.
The final paper in this section, by James Arvanitakis, also challenges the idea that a 'natural' community can emerge from those 'with a shared experience of hurt'. The assumption that all who have experienced racism have a common interest can be dangerous when the reality of collaboration entails exclusion and even betrayal. This can happen when 'those with the greatest hurt can claim to be an exclusive group based on their distance from whiteness: they become the "gatekeepers" who refuse to allow others the same status'.
As an 'almost white' male, Arvanitakis asks whether his claims of being hurt by racism can be recognised by those who may have experienced greater hurt, and how this shapes the possibilities for collaboration. Ultimately, Arvanitakis calls for activists to move away from this kind of thinking altogether, as he argues, communities based on a 'hierarchy of hurt'
simply reinforce the very logic of whiteness that anti-racists are trying to eradicate. Activists need to resist the urge to seek out people 'like us' for collaboration, and build communities based on a sharing of difference.
Overall, the papers in this section provide a range of perspectives on the question of crosscultural activist collaboration. All show the challenges and complexity of working across difference, and point to various strategies to avoid the negative unintended consequences of uncritical solidarity, which can lead to new relationships of exclusion. Exposing these challenges is not intended to discourage cross-cultural collaboration, but rather to provide activists with some tools for thinking through a complex process, so that the result may more closely resemble genuinely productive, inclusive and respectful alliance-building. 
